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1 The aim of the present essay is to examine the views of Charles S. Peirce and Umberto Eco
with regard to signs and semiotics1 in order to assess their relation to Peirce’s mature
pragmatism (after 1903). Such an assessment might be done in a number of ways, but
taking the path of semiotics, apart from being an obvious approach, also reveals some
interesting things about pragmatism itself. Both thinkers attempted to set out a truly
general theory of signs, and ran into difficulties on similar points. By “truly general,” I
mean a theory that covers all cases of meaning-generation, and while the theory may
derive from generalizations that arise from particular experience,  as human learning
usually  does,  the  truly  general  would  not  be  dependent upon  any  given  particular
experience for its “validity” (although one hesitates to use that vexed word), or reference
to the objective world. William James restricted the scope of pragmatism to what can be
generalized from particular experience, but it is well known that Peirce would have none
of that restriction, re-founding pragmatism to get around the nominalism implied by
James’s view.
2 The responses of Peirce and Eco to the difficulties that arose in seeking a truly general
theory of signs were quite different. Both Peirce and Eco were allergic to transcendental
claims (the latter more than the former) of the Kantian stripe, but apart from that shared
aversion,  they had different  ideas about possibility.  Peirce was not  averse to sincere
metaphysics. Eco was mostly indifferent to metaphysics and treated it as an interesting
language  game,  peculiar  to  philosophers  (and  other  cults  and  secret  societies).  In
addition, Eco was not obsessed with avoiding nominalism, while for Peirce no greater
error – one is tempted to say “sin” – could be committed. 
3 These differences are far-reaching. And yet, the differences are not so deep as to prevent
us from thinking of both Peirce and Eco as pragmatists, and perhaps of a similar stripe.
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Most of the differences between Eco and Peirce can be found also as differences between
Peirce and almost all others we regularly call “pragmatists,” especially James and Rorty.
But Eco has some points of agreement with Peirce most others do not. None of the other
standard pragmatists, apart from Charles Morris and Josiah Royce, could really be called a
semiotician.  Many  doubt  whether  one  ought  to  call  either  of  these  other  two
“pragmatists.”  This  overlap  provides  more reason  rather  than  less  to  undertake  a
comparison of Eco and Peirce on this precise question. 
4 My strategy will be to examine the goal of achieving a “truly general” theory of signs (in a
sense to be explained). The results may be applicable to the question of whether we ought
to think of Morris and Royce as pragmatists in any robust way, and in considering the
matter, one thing that will  come to light is that we probably would not call Peirce a
pragmatist  at  all  had he not  invented the term.2 The historians of  pragmatism have
tended to acknowledge Peirce for the term and then to make either James of Dewey the
most important point of reference. Thus, we will need to clarify the sense of the term in
considering Peirce and Eco in light of this history.
 
2. Peirce and the Quest for a Truly General Theory of
Signs
5 In making his theory truly general, explaining every occurrence of meaning wherever
meaning is possible, Peirce was obliged to claim that signs are more than abstract terms
and  operators.  Beginning  in  1903,  he  metaphysicalized  signs  and  began  to  identify
Firstness with possibility. For Peirce (for most of his career) the sign had both a concrete
and  an  abstract  nature.3 As  he  matured,  the  concrete-functional  aspect  of  the  sign
gradually diminished in his thinking about signs, but whether it completely disappeared
is, as we shall see, a point of contention among Peirce scholars. In any case, throughout
the vast majority of his life, Peirce held that the sign is abstract in its capacity to be
related to other signs without any required reference to their genesis, while signs are
concrete in their capacity to be related to empirical functioning.4 The former is semiotic
determination of signs by other signs, while the latter is determination of the world by
signs and of signs by the world. In the former case, “logic” (in the broadest, normative
sense) is the operating system and the relations revealed are reflective in character. In the
latter, the determination is epistemic and has to do with the way beliefs are formed and
acted upon. 
6 Hence, there are two modes of determination of the sign, one abstract and logical (what I
call “operative”), and the other concrete and functional. The relation between concrete
and abstract determination, prior to 1903, was an on-going problem for Peirce.5 I think
1903 marks a turning point due to Royce’s very specific influence on Peirce which, in this
instance, was largely negative, teaching Peirce what he did not want to assert. Peirce and
Royce had been in correspondence about logic between 1898 and 1903, and 1899 is when
Royce’s The World and the Individual: Series One was published (from his Gifford lectures).6
Peirce’s review of that book (which appeared in 1900) makes very plain that he saw what
others did not in Royce’s central claim: that the entire exercise was about the difference
between which possibilities are “forced” upon our imaginations and which are not, when
we make a knowledge claim.7 The full issue of possibility lies well beyond my current
project,  but  it  is  crucial  to  note  that  over  the  next  three  years,  Peirce  adjusted his
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categories (yet again),  and hence his “pragmatism” when he identified Firstness with
possibility in 1903 (see below).8 No one else thought Royce’s project was about which
possibilities are forced on our imaginations in knowledge claims (I read every review;
Peirce’s is way off in a corner by itself). The claim that this is what Royce’s book was
about will seem extravagant and adventitious to most readers of the book. Peirce was
always  an  active  reader,  in  the  sense  that  he  often  saw  what  others  did  not,  and
sometimes it is doubtful whether what he saw was really in the text.
7 From 1900 to 1903, Peirce misunderstood Royce’s central claim. He believed that Royce
critique of “realism” was an explicit critique of the sort of “realism” Peirce had been
defending in correspondence with Royce and earlier. He was mistaken. Peirce’s was not
the sort of view Royce had in mind, as Peirce later learned, but the mistake led to one of
the most creative and interesting misreadings in the history of philosophy – something
Eco would appreciate, playfully and profoundly. In his review of Royce’s book, Peirce
therefore made up a criticism of himself that Royce never imagined, and began responding
to that criticism (in the review and beyond), using Royce as a surrogate for the defender
of the view. 
8 The  review  was  accompanied  by  correspondence  with  Royce  (unfortunately  only
fragments survive – another point Eco would appreciate), which, if we can piece together
with the published writings, creates an amazing, if unfinished, sketch of the movement
from Peirce’s  struggles  with  his  categories  and semiotics  within the  syllogism to  his
rejection of the syllogism and the creation of a truly general theory of signs (after 1903). 
9 In short, Royce and Peirce corresponded until it dawned on Peirce that his own version of
“realism” was not Royce’s target, but in the three years during which he had mistaken
Royce’s intent, he had devised arguments he thought were Royce’s, but which were far
better than Royce’s, and which obliged him to throw off classical logic and develop a truly
general theory of signs. It is a great moment in the play of signs. The great critic of Peirce,
unbeknownst to Peirce, was Peirce. It is like Eco’s Simone Simonini trying to catch a
glimpse of the stranger in his house in The Prague Cemetery.
10 Peirce  made numerous  attempts  to  settle,  in  his  own thinking,  how these  modes  of
determination (semiotic-abstract and epistemic-concrete) are related. The solution had to
account for the efficacy of false beliefs and the metaphysical grounding of our capacity to
form true beliefs in a self-correcting manner. What, in the end, is the relation between
knowledge and meaning? Can one know what one cannot even make sense of? This question
is peculiar to the pragmatic theory of knowledge,  basically because pragmatists truly
make knowing functional (in some sense), although clearly Peirce is not thinking about
concrete “functioning” in the way James or Dewey did. For Peirce, fixing belief can be
done in at least four ways, so tenacity and authority and a priorism are functional, but
they are not self-correcting.9 Eco has obviously had a great deal of fun over the years
creating narratives in which people never discover their errors. I will return to this point
in  the  next  section.  For  now,  we  see  that  Peirce  has  an  unusual  view.  For  most
epistemologists,  there  is  a  tight  relationship  between  meaning  and  knowledge.  One
cannot know what is meaningless, so the sets the “floor” of knowing. The ceiling is that
one cannot know the full meaning of knowledge claim, because knowing a thing’s full
meaning requires knowing all it implies for the future, and we are not ideally situated
inquirers. For the latter, there would be a convergence of knowledge and meaning. For
us,  there  is  a  floor  and a  ceiling  to  the  act  of  knowing,  but  having meaning is  not
sufficient for scientific knowing. There must be doubt and resolution, which makes the
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meaning explicit and places it in a context of future self-correction. So meaning can be
ubiquitous but it must be harnessed or gathered in order to become known, for Peirce. We
can imagine it as a round-up and branding of the herd. Some of the beasts may remain on
the range,  unlocated by the cowboys,  meaningfully chewing the cud,  suitable for the
market, but they won’t be part of the knowledge-herd.10 They are merely operationally
suitable  for  hamburger  or  steak,  but  those  in  the herd  are  functionally  hamburger
already. Thus, knowledge, for a pragmatist depends on being herded. From 1867 onward,
Peirce characterized this gathering of meaning as the rise from “substance” to “being,”
from what might be predicated to what is predicated.11
11 After 1903 (perhaps due to the influence of Royce), Peirce shifted his interpretation of his
categories and solved this problem by treating signs as determined only abstractly. He
was unable to handle the question of  concrete-functional  determinations of  meaning
within the theory of signs after 1903 and so addressed these problems without appealing
to the theory of signs (as he then understood it).  Determinations of meaning became
power  of  signs  –and everything that  exists  is  a  sign,  not  just  possibly,  but  actually.
Obviously  this  move  committed  Peirce  to  the  idea  that  everything  that  exists  is
meaningful. Its epistemic determination as a part of our knowledge has no influence on
the meaningfulness of existing entities after 1903. Obviously Dewey, James, Royce, and
Rorty would not allow meaning and knowledge to be separated this way, but Whitehead
and Bergson (more explicitly sympathetic to panpsychism) would say,  “yes,  matter is
effete mind,” or something similar. In any case meaning is unaffected by our knowing it
in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  dependent  on that  kind of  determination in  order  to  be,
meaningfully. This toying with the independence of meaning from knowing is not usually
associated with pragmatism, but it has to be considered in looking at Peirce’s mature
pragmatism.
 
3. Eco’s Ideas about Signs and Meaning
12 Those who know Eco’s ideas about knowledge will already have anticipated my case in
this section. Eco differed from Peirce on this point about (what I am calling) concrete and
abstract determination of the sign only insofar as Eco was unwilling to claim that signs are
capable of dealing with subjective functions (recalling my sense of the term “function”) –
regardless of whether these functions be abstract or concrete. In short, what is under-
determined is not the sign or the world, it is the subject’s world. Thus, with this one
exception, Eco agreed, I think, with the pre-1903 Peirce that signs, themselves, do form a
bridge from the abstract  realm to the concrete by means of  something like a “sign-
function.” In Eco’s case, however, this is not taken to provide for us any adequate account
of the self and its functions, whether it is doubting or resolving that doubt tenaciously,
scientifically, a prioristically, or from authority. For Eco, you can be subjectively wherever
you  happen  to  be  and  the  knowledge  relation  may  function  as  it  objectively  does
regardless of whether you are the knower. What others know or no one knows functions
the same in determining you as an object regardless of your subjective condition. 
13 As an example, Ecoʼs novel Foucaultʼs Pendulum (which was his favorite of his own novels)
has its significant action centered around a cryptic piece of paper left in a publishers
office by a mysterious man (who may or may not have been murdered after his one visit
to that office – we never find out). The piece of paper contains what seem to be notations
about a location and what was to be found there. The three main characters come to
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believe that these “instructions” were written long ago by some people who had hidden
the esoteric documents of a secret society (which secret society is an open question). At a
crucial moment in the story, the girlfriend of the main character snatches the piece of
paper (to see what all the fuss is about) and she rather convincingly shows that all the
signs fit together around the hypothesis that it is in fact just a grocery list. But it doesn’t
matter. The action barrels on to the spectacular death of one of the main characters in
spite  of  the  revelation  that  the  “secret”  is  no  secret,  just  a  grocery  list.  The  main
character, Casubon, becomes diffident, subjectively, about the meaning of the scrap of
paper, and it makes no difference to the chain of objective determinations affecting him
and his friend. Sign determinations and meanings function like this for Eco.
14 Being a pragmatist, I asked Eco once: “Was it just a grocery list?” His answer was “I donʼt
know.” Of course, the list was his own creation, as an author. I was asking whether in
creating the list he had purposely adjusted it for both groceries and directions. He knew
what I was asking. I believe he could have gone further and said “I canʼt know.” How can
Eco’s semiotic theory deal with (1) “I donʼt know” as a sincere answer to my query about
his intentions? and (2) why do I think he can go further and say: “I canʼt know” as an
authorial response to the same? Most importantly, (3) how would a pragmatic theory of
knowledge that has made Peirce’s move after 1903 satisfy the constitutive question (and
also, therefore the epistemological question) when the answer is either “I donʼt know” or
“I canʼt know”?
15 I  do  not  think  that  a  conventional  pragmatist  (James,  Dewey,  Rorty)  has  anything
interesting to say about this question because they refuse to radicalize the independence
of meaning. Yet, I would insist, with Peirce, that the radical independence of meaning
from  situated  acts  of  knowing  is  a  genuine  implication  of  any  thorough-going
pragmatism. Much to my disappointment, Royce also does not have anything interesting
to say about this question. Only Peirce and Whitehead clearly recognized that meaning is
a characteristic of possibility, not of actuality, and that every attempt to limit meaning to
the actual undermines the future of knowledge.
16 It seems to me, as a pragmatist, that there is a fact of the matter, within the story, as to
whether the cryptic piece of paper is or isn’t a grocery list. To give up on that claim is to
abandon the presupposed history (the unity of action, in Aristotle’s terms) that governs
the narrative. Foucault’s Pendulum is not science fiction or fantasy or magical realism, or
any other genre that tampers with the three unities. The novel studiously observes all
three unities. Hence, the piece of paper has a history that either does or does not include
having been a grocery list. Either these characters have a true belief or a false belief,
regardless of whether any of them is experiencing any doubt. The fact (in the story) is
that the piece of paper functions entirely as such a valuable document,  even if everyone
(except the girlfriend) is wrong about it. Eco could have left that scene out and it wouldn’t
have changed anything (except our level of understanding about the contingency of the
interpretation of Casubon and his friends). Indeed, Eco need never have had the idea that
it was a grocery list, and it still might have been one. But it seems very likely, to suspicious
pragmatists, that the list started as a grocery list, and Eco knew it, and that is why he told
us  what  the  girlfriend  saw.  Yet,  in  this  example,  authorial  intentions  neither  do
determine the meaning here, nor can they. I think that accounts for Eco’s answer, which
he delivered playfully.  He had been asked that  question many times before,  I  would
wager. I didn’t get anything new from him.
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17 But many people also asked him whether his  novels  were intended to exemplify his
theories about language and intention. His answer to me about that question was that he
didn’t set out to do any such thing, but yes, he can see why people see that tendency in
the novels.  Without dropping back into a subjective “intentionalist” stance about the
text, he allows that common sense will inform us that the theories are his and the novels
are his and we ought not be surprised if they bear certain similarities. This does not
satisfy a suspicious pragmatist. If the pragmatist is a Deweyan or Jamesian or Rortyan, no
satisfaction will  ever be had from Eco because they will  not  accept his  solution (see
below). 
18 But what if the suspicious pragmatist is a Peircean? For Peirce, Eco’s answer raises a
further question, one which poses a difficulty for Eco, in my opinion. Indeed, Eco poses
the problem himself in his discussion of types of forgeries, replicas, and fakes. This essay
offers the situation in Foucault’s Pendulum,  but made even worse. Having disconnected
meaning and knowledge, as Peirce finally did (embracing “unlimited semiosis” in Eco’s
terms, or a “truly general theory of signs” in my terms12),  and seeing that fakes may
never be identified as fakes, even though they are fakes (i.e., there is a fact of the matter),
Eco asks “is a fake a sign?” (Eco 1990b: 184). He discusses “expressions” as incomplete
signs,  falling  short  of  full-signhood for  lack  of  Thirdness,  but  then Eco sets  out  the
standard procedure  for  determining  authenticity.  Here,  for  our  highest  standards  of
knowing an  original,  an  authentic  original  must  be  “ a  sign  of  its  own  origin”  (Eco’s
emphasis). Recognizing the clear circularity, for us, of this habit of “modern philology,”
Eco says:
If a fake is not a sign, for modern philology the original, in order to be compared
with its fake copy, must be approached as a sign. False identification is a semiosic
web  of  misunderstandings  and  deliberate  lies,  whereas  any  effort  to  “correct”
authentication is a clear case of semiosic interpretation or of abduction. (Eco 1990b:
193; Eco’s emphasis)
Thus,  we see that  the detaching of  meaning from knowledge has also sacrificed self-
correction in  the semiotic  process.  The effect  is  to  make abduction the ground of  all
interpretation, and the result is that all knowledge is, for us, guesswork. Now, for Peirce
such a result would be disastrous for his pragmatism. For Eco it seems to be only a strange
feature of the world. He is light-hearted about it. Oh well, so knowledge is one kind of
meaning,  and  not  an  especially  reliable  one.  But,  having  destroyed  all  possibility  of
satisfactory criteria for knowing whether a given artifact is a fake, Eco says that “even
though  no  single  criterion  [nor  combination  of  criteria]  is  one-hundred-percent
satisfactory, we usually rely on reasonable conjectures on the grounds of some balanced
evaluation of the various tests. Thus we cast in doubt the socially accepted authenticity of
an object only when some contrary evidence comes to trouble our established beliefs.”
(Eco 1990b: 200).
19 That sounds like Jamesian pragmatism, and like James’s (mis)understanding of how doubt
operates (what Peirce objected to). But James would never detach meaning from truth in
such a fashion, regardless of what Bertrand Russell may have charged him with doing.
James was a nominalist, not a nihilist. Further, we must remember that Eco has a highly
nuanced account of abduction, and he allows (with Peirce) that abduction pervades all
inference (hence all knowledge), but not all semiosis. Meaning can occur (if that is the right
word) without anyone knowing it, ever. Now, Peirce maintains both the self-correcting
character  of  scientific  knowing  and  the  independence  of  meaning  in  his  mature
pragmatism, but he is chastened. The distinction between reasoning about meaning and
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reasoning about knowledge is sharply distinguished in a manuscript intended for Peirce’s
Illustrations  of  the  Logic  of  Science,  as  he  tried for  a  final  time (1909)  to  bring it  into
acceptable condition for publication. He thinks that when we reason about our states of
consciousness, as a theory of knowledge requires, the subjective side of the task is almost
impossible:
The observation of what one is doing and suffering [such as doubt] in his inner
consciousness – assuming that it can be done at all, which some shrewdly doubt – is
certainly far more difficult than is, for example, the management of a high-power
microscope so as to resolve the most difficult test-objects; and to do simultaneously
the  two  things  that  it  is  requisite  to  do  at  the  same  time  in  order  –  while
concentrating all  one’s  being upon a Reasoning,  as one needs to do in order to
discover new hypotheses at the same time – directly to observe what immediate
consciousness (i.e.,  oneself, or that part of oneself that appears) does and suffers
during that reasoning, is harder yet, by far. (Peirce 2014: 240-1)13
Thus, we see that the ubiquity of abduction wars with our efforts to catch a glimpse of
ourselves as we move from doubt to resolution. We see Peirce moving away, as Eco did,
from the subjective functioning of signs. This is not an adequation of the knowing subject
to the reality known, and it is not simply the relief of inner doubts. These words were
meant to be published alongside “The Fixation of Belief,” and the other essays that had
been basic to his theory of knowledge. But the construct of the “ideally situated inquirer
in  the  infinitely  distant  future”  is  maintained  by  Peirce  at  this  late  date,  so  that
“unlimited semiosis” (as Eco calls it) can be a presupposition of his philosophy without
abdicating knowledge. In a letter to Paul Carus in 1909, Peirce apologizes for not being
able to bring his theory of knowledge into acceptable condition, but attacks the problem
of possibility again, saying that knowledge consists of acceptability (in the interim) of a
proposition, but that these propositions mix actuality and possibility.  His new theory
(plausibility, verisimilitude, and probability) is a mess, in my opinion (and in his own),
but he comes out saying:
As for the validity of the hypothesis, the retroduction [i.e., abduction], there seems
at first to be no room at all for the question of what supports it, since from actual
fact it  only infers what may be,  – may be and may be not.  But there is a decided
leaning to the affirmative side and the frequency with which that turns out to be an
actual fact is to me quite the most surprising of all the wonders of the universe. I
hope there are few men who are so often deceived as I. They surely cannot be many.
Yet I could tell you of conjectures pronounced by me with a confidence I could not
comprehend,  and that were verified amazingly.  I  simply should not dare to tell
them; I feel my credit would not support such tales. (Peirce 2014: 282)
Peirce goes on to list  a  number of  cases in the history of  science in which Faraday,
Galilleo, and Kepler guessed what was true. Thus, where self-correction has fallen into
disuse, the unreasonable success of science, in finding the right hypothesis, stands at the
heart  of  knowing in  the  past  and in  the  future.  Pragmatism becomes,  therefore,  an
leaning toward the affirmative that says, “go ahead, make something up, and then let it
surprise  you.”  I  do  not  have  to  tell  these  readers  that  Eco  wrote  both  novels  and
philosophy by making things up and then finding out they were true. Insofar as he gave
in to the affirmative leaning, he was surely the sort of pragmatist Peirce was. I doubt that
Eco read this letter to Carus, or the manuscript I cited above. But it isn’t necessary to say
he did. He really did follow Peirce in the affirmative leaning.
20 Eco realized he had to have a function that answered to Peirce’s ideally situated inquirer
– or there would be no difference between him and Rorty (and every nominalist aesthete).
Eco wanted a more robust pragmatism than James, Rorty, even Dewey (Eco liked Dewey’s
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aesthetics quite a lot). Eco’s pragmatism was a pragmatism of independent meaning and
ubiquitous abduction. He wanted a truly general semiotics. In discussing Peirce’s theory
of meaning, he said: 
In the framework of Peirce’s philosophy of unlimited semiosis, (i) every expression
must be interpreted by another expression, and so on ad infinitum; (ii) the very
activity of interpretation is the only way to define the contents of the expressions;
(iii)  in  the  course  of  the  semiosic  process  the  socially  recognized  meaning  of
expressions grows through the interpretations they undergo in different contexts
and  in  different  historical  circumstances;  (iv)  the  complete  meaning  of  a  sign
cannot but be the historical recording of the pragmatic labor that has accompanied
every contextual instance of it; (v) to interpret a sign means to foresee – ideally – all
the  possible  contexts  in  which  it  can  be inserted.  Peirce’s  logic  of  relatives
transforms the semantic representation of a term into a potential text. […] In Eco
1976  (2.11.5)  and  1984  (2.3)  I  have  proposed  a  semantic  model  for  the
representation of the ideal content of indices (be they words, gestures or images) in
an ideal situation of actual reference. (Eco 1990c: 213-4)
Obviously,  for  my purposes,  we will  see Eco’s  idea of  growth as  a  substitute for  self
correction, his use of history and the “socially recognized meaning” as a substitute for
the society of inquirers, the complete meaning of the sign foreseen operating as “the
infinitely  distant  future”  and the  ideal  content  of  indices  as  a  substitute  for  ideally
situated inquiry. 
21 I  do not mean to imply that Eco’s theory of meaning is exactly the same as Peirce’s.
Elsewhere I have given a detailed discussion of the differences and similarities. Peirce and
Eco  approach  this  abstract/concrete  duality  of  signs,  and  the  theory  of  signs  more
generally,  in quite different ways.  The most  obvious difference is  that  while Peirce's
theory is triadic (revolving around sign, object and interpretant, with this latter bringing
the sign-user into the formula), Eco’s is a modification of the dyadic theory of Saussure
(which is  built  up  entirely  from the  relation of  sign  and signified  –  no  sign-user  is
considered14), but Eco’s dyad is operational, in my sense, and it is a difference that reaches
to  the  core.  For  Eco,  the  fact  of  lying  is  more  important  than  telling  the  truth,  or
attempting  to  tell  the  truth.  As  he  says,  “semiotics  is  in  principle  the  discipline  of
studying everything which can be used in order to lie. If something cannot be used to tell
a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth: it cannot in fact be used ‘to tell’ at all. I
think that the definition of a ‘theory of the lie’ should be taken as a pretty comprehensive
program for general semiotics.” (Eco 1975: 6-7; 0.1.3).
22 Part of the reason I began this paper by using the awkward phrase a “truly general”
theory of signs is to distinguish it from “a pretty comprehensive program for a general
semiotics.” At the level of function, i.e.,  sign-function, both Peirce and Eco sought to
make out a truly general theory of signs. Although I believe the preceding discussion has
made out in a general way the relation between Peirce and Eco, and I believe I have done
so in a way that is suggestive of Eco’s pragmatism, it is still only a preliminary outline. 
 
4. Triadic and Dyadic Semiotics
23 I take Peirce and Eco to be the finest examples of their respective camps, and I really do
think,  although I  do not wish to over-emphasize it,  that  their  temperaments (to use
James’s characterization) are fairly close to being opposites. Both are playful, but Peirce’s
earnestness is very American. It is hard to sell such a viewpoint in the Old World. Still, I
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am confident  that  the  limitations  of  these  two theories  accurately  demonstrate  and
reflect  the  limits  of  semiotics  more  generally.  Rather  than  trying  to  resolve  the
difficulties both Peirce and Eco have come up against, I propose that the theory of signs
simply be restricted in such a way as to mollify the problem. I am eliminating the demand
to resolve it. A pragmatic thesis guides the path forward: the theory of signs is capable of
sufficiently accounting for the proper uses of language considered as a purely abstract (in
the sense I have used that term above) phenomenon (i.e., appearance), but our difficulties
begin  when semiotics  endeavors  to  consider  any  genetic  or  concrete  (and  therefore
temporal) aspect of language. In short, semiosis happens at the level of possibility, not
actuality. Meaning is the creature of possible relations and refuses to bow to actuality.
That is why lies can go on forever and a truly general theory of signs loses its grip on
knowledge, but pervades abduction. Thus, the limitation I propose for the theory of signs
is that it should be restricted to being the theory of language considered abstractly. It
should deal only with the way in which abstract signs are related to one another, and to
their objects – that is, “objects” taken in the abstract sense, as a word among words; not
in the sense of concrete, discretely existing individuals. As Eco’s example goes, we do not
worry about actual peanuts and their relation to peanut butter when we study semiotics.
We worry only about what can be used to lie, and thus to tell the truth.15 This latter
distinction between the concrete and abstract senses of the word “object” is of crucial
significance  for  my  thesis  about  the  path  forward,  and  it  very  much  follows  the
discussions of “Objekt” versus “Gegenstand” one finds in Kant’s three critiques. However, a
detailed discussion of this matter awaits a later essay.16
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NOTES
1. [Note of the editor (the editor thanks Francesco Bellucci for his help). Peirce’s semiotic theory
after 1903 can be found in the Logic Notebook (1905-1906; 1909), in the letters to Welby (1904;
1908) and in the pragmatist papers (1905-1907). Auxier quotes (from De Waal’s edition) a 1909
text  that,  according  to  Peirce,  had  to  serve  as  an  introduction  to  the  re-publishing  of  the
“Illustrations” of 1877-1878. Many different versions of this introduction are called “Meaning”
(for instance, MS 637, 630, 640, 652 etc.). The reference here is to the Harvard Lectures of 1903,
when  Peirce  returns  to  pragmatism  after  the  works  of  1877-1878.  See  also  The  Monist’s
pragmatist series (1905-1906).]
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2. I have examined the question about Royce in detail elsewhere (see Auxier 2013, ch. 4). I have
also  done a  generalized  comparison of  types  of  pragmatism in  Auxier  (2011;  2009).  See  also
Auxier 2006.
3. I am employing the terms “concrete” and “abstract” in a fashion similar to Whitehead’s usage.
I do this to avoid the word “mind,” since the term (as Peirce used it) will be too easily confused
with subjectivity of a Cartesian sort. The question of “mind” in analyzing Peirce and Eco is an
important one, but that is not my topic in this essay, so I set it aside by focusing on what is
“concrete” and “functional” as contrasted with what is “abstract” and “operative.” For more on
the role of  abstraction in Whitehead’s sense,  see Auxier & Herstein 2017.  Peirce’s  manner of
defining abstraction in his “New List of Categories” (1867) is in keeping with my usage here, but I
intend the term more broadly, inclusive of Peirce’s definition there. [Note of the editor. On Peirce’s
idea of “abstraction,” see Zeman 1982.]
4. [Note  of  the  editor.  In  his  book Peirce’s  Theory  of  Signs  (Short  2007),  T. L. Short  claims that,
according to the young Peirce of the anti-cartesian essays, a sign refers to its object only through
the mediation of another sign (semiotic idealism). On the contrary, according to the late Peirce
(in Short’s  opinion,  after  1885),  a  sign can refer  to  its  object  without  mediation,  as  index is
supposed to do. On the contrary, Auxier introduces here a different thesis: “As he matured, the
concrete-functional aspect of the sign gradually diminished in his thinking about signs.” (p. 3).
“After  1903  (perhaps  due  to  the  influence  of  Royce),  Peirce  shifted  his  interpretation of  his
categories and solved this problem by treating signs as determined only abstractly.” (p. 6). And a
very different thesis concerns also the idea of “infinite semiosis”: “Having disconnected meaning
and knowledge, as Peirce finally did (embracing ‘unlimited semiosis’ in Eco’s terms, or a ‘truly
general theory of signs’ in my terms).” (p. 10). According to Short, it was the young Peirce to
believe in unlimited semiosis, while, around 1907, Peirce would have put a limit to it through the
idea of habit. Auxier challenges this idea here.]
5. Eco’s  parsing  of  abduction  (which  dominates  all  knowing,  for  Peirce,  as  he  reports)  into
creative abductions, meta-abductions, and over/undercoded abductions is actually one version of
stating  this  problem.  Other  commentators  have  stated  the  struggle  otherwise,  but  everyone
agrees that Peirce himself was unsatisfied with his solution. I will present this problem in my
own terms,  but  I  think Eco’s  essay shows he was keenly aware of  the sort  of  problem I  am
describing. See Eco 1983. Eco repeats this favorite criticism of Peirce in Eco 1990a. It lies beyond
the scope of this paper to make an argument for Peirce’s development. Generally I follow the
course described by Deledalle 1990. Deledalle achieves an admirable perspicacity in this book by
leaving aside complications about external influences on Peirce’s thinking, simply following the
trail of development in Peirce’s writings and manuscripts. 
6. For  the  history  of  their  relationship,  see  Oppenheim  2005.  As  good  as  this  treatment  is,
Oppenheim has overlooked some very important evidence and the implications.
7. See  Peirce,  The  Collected  Papers  of  Charles  Sanders  Peirce,  8  vols.  eds  C. Hartshorne  et  al.
(Cambridge, Harvard Belknap Press, 1931-1958), vol 8, p. 75 ff. (paragraphs 101-104; hereafter this
collection will be cited as “CP” followed by the vol. and paragraph number, e.g., CP 8:101, and so
forth). Here Peirce contrasts Royce’s view of possibility with his own (paragraph 102).
8. [Note of the editor.  On the notion of “possibility” after 1903, see Lane 2007, who outlines an
evolution of this concept after 1896.]
9. See “The Fixation of Belief,” 1877, W 3: 242-57; CP 5.358-87. 
10. I hope that readers will remember Eco’s entertaining use of the arguments about ruminants
in his  essay on Peirce,  “Horns,  Hooves,  and Insteps:  Some Hypotheses  about  Three Types of
Abduction” (Eco 1983).
11. See “On a New List of Categories,” W 2:49-59; CP 1.545-59.
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12. [Note of the editor. On the “truly general theory of signs,” a classic references is M. H. Fisch,
“Peirce’s General Theory of Signs” (Fisch 1978; 1986).]
13. De Waal has done the scholarly community a tremendous service by compiling what this
book would have looked like if Peirce had been able to finish it. His careful documentation of the
full path from the 1877 manuscripts through to the last versions of the book are, in my opinion,
the  single  most  telling  document  published  to  date  that  demonstrates  the  development  of
Peirce’s thought. My statements in this paper about Peirce’s development are, I believe, in close
keeping with what this book shows.
14. Eco very adeptly compares Saussure and Peirce right at the beginning of his own theory, and
neatly praises Peirce while reducing him to Saussure in order to avoid dealing with subjectivity
(See Eco 1975: 16-7; 0.5).
15. Ibid.
16. Unhappily,  one  needs  also  a  temporal  theory  of  language  to  supplement  this  version  of
semiotics, and I will not be able to address that here. I have written elsewhere about it. 
ABSTRACTS
This paper aims to consider Peirce and Eco’s approach to signs and semiotics in order to assess
their relation to Peirce’s mature pragmatism. Both thinkers attempted to set out a truly general
theory of signs, and ran into difficulties on similar points. I show that the responses of Peirce and
Eco to the difficulties that arose in seeking a truly general theory of signs were quite different.
And yet, the differences are not so deep as to prevent us from thinking of both Peirce and Eco as
pragmatists, and perhaps of a similar stripe.
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